UK Migration — Party Proposals: Costed Implications

A comparable, costed cross-party analysis of UK migration proposals as of May 2026. For each of the nine parties: stated proposals, proposal-by-proposal cost ranges, savings/revenue ranges, net fiscal effect (with HIGH/MEDIUM/LOW confidence labels), implications from inside the party's worldview AND from external analytical perspective, deliverability constraints, legal exposure, and likely behavioural responses. A comparative summary table at the end across all nine parties. Approximately 25,000-30,000 words. The companion to the nine party briefings, written from outside each worldview rather than from inside it.

What this document is

This document takes each of the 9 parties covered in the master reference and, for each, sets out:

1. The party's stated proposals, as published in their May 2026 platform 2. Costing of each proposal — cost range, savings/revenue range, net fiscal effect, with confidence labels (HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW) 3. Implications, good and bad — both the party's own view (sympathetic to their framing) and the external analytical view (stepping outside) 4. Deliverability constraints — operational, legal, capacity, timeline 5. Legal exposure — ECHR, Refugee Convention, Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, TCA, retrospective-application risks 6. Likely behavioural responses — by employers, migrants, source countries, returnee cohorts, asylum-seeker behaviour

How to read this document

This is the analytical companion to the 9 party briefings. The party briefings (in sub_documents/) are written from inside each party's worldview. This document is written from outside — examining what the proposals would actually cost, do, and provoke if implemented as stated.

• HIGH: official published costings or strong directly-applicable evidence (e.g. NAO asylum accommodation costs; MAC fiscal modelling; HMRC/HO linked earnings data)
• MEDIUM: derived from official data with reasonable assumptions, or published-but-unaudited modelling
• LOW: behavioural responses, retrospective-application effects, or claims based on weak/contested evidence

Where confidence is LOW, the range will be wide and the wording cautious. This is honest disagreement with reality, not hedging — these are genuinely difficult to forecast.

Cost-saving sign convention. A positive cost figure is a fiscal cost (net outflow). A positive saving figure is a fiscal benefit (net inflow). The "net fiscal effect" line gives the combined direction.

Common cost components

Several components recur across multiple parties' proposals. Reference values used throughout this document:

Component	Unit value	Source / confidence
Voluntary return	~£4,300 per person	Home Office YE Dec 2025 (HIGH)
Enforced return	~£48,800 per person	Home Office YE Dec 2025 (HIGH)
Asylum hotel accommodation	~£170 per person per day	NAO May 2025 (HIGH)
Asylum dispersal accommodation	~£27 per person per day	NAO May 2025 (HIGH; varies)
Detention space	~£40,000-£100,000 per person per year	Operational range, HMG reporting (MEDIUM)
Skilled Worker main applicant lifetime PV (median)	+£689,000	MAC December 2025 (MEDIUM-HIGH)
Family Partner lifetime PV (median)	-£109,000	MAC December 2025 (MEDIUM-HIGH)
Health & Care dependant lifetime PV (median)	-£67,000	MAC December 2025 (MEDIUM-HIGH)
ECHR withdrawal: estimated annual cost from international cooperation/trade effects	uncertain — £2-15bn range	LOW (modelled, not measured)
Mass deportation operation: cost per person enforcement, no transit capacity	£100,000-£200,000	LOW (no precedent at scale)

These are the building blocks. Where a party's proposal is "deport 150,000 per year", the document combines detention-day cost + per-person enforcement cost + behavioural-response costs to give a defensible range.

1. Labour

Stated proposals (May 2026 platform)

Labour governs through three frameworks: May 2025 White Paper, December 2025 Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act, March 2026 statement of changes implementing 30-month refugee status reviews.

Specific proposals: 1. 30-month refugee status reviews (rather than continuing automatic settlement after 5 years) 2. No numerical cap on legal migration (rejected, against opposition pressure) 3. Route-specific tightening rather than headline cuts (Health & Care minimum salary increases; Family route partner threshold rebalancing; Skilled Worker route stable) 4. One-in-one-out France returns scheme (active August 2025-March 2026: 377 returns to France, 380 admitted to UK) 5. Asylum accommodation reform — reducing hotel use, expanding dispersal 6. Border Security Command and modest enforcement scale-up (no 150,000 deportation target) 7. Continued ECHR membership and rejection of mass deportation framing 8. Investment in integration (English language, employment support) — modest funding but framed as priority

Costed implications

Proposal	Cost range	Savings/revenue range	Net fiscal effect	Confidence
30-month refugee status reviews	£40-70m/yr (Home Office capacity)	Behaviourally uncertain — £100-300m/yr if returns rate increases by 5-10pp	Net positive (-£60m to +£260m)	LOW (behavioural response unknown)
Asylum accommodation reform (hotel exit)	£200-400m setup (dispersal procurement, LA grants)	£1.0-1.6bn/yr at full hotel exit (NAO data)	Strongly positive (£600m-1.4bn/yr after Yr 2)	HIGH (NAO source)
France one-in-one-out scheme	£15-30m/yr (operational)	Marginal direct: ~£2-5m savings on small-boat reception	Net negative — but value is in deterrence not direct fiscal	LOW (deterrent effect unmeasured)
Health & Care salary increase	£0 direct	£400-800m/yr from reduced dependant flow over 5yrs	Modestly positive	MEDIUM
Family route threshold maintained	£0 direct	£100-300m/yr from reduced low-contribution settlement	Modestly positive	MEDIUM
Border Security Command + enforcement	£200-500m/yr	£200-600m/yr (returns volume increase)	Roughly neutral; political signal value	MEDIUM
Continued ECHR membership	£0 direct	Avoids £2-15bn cascade from withdrawal	Strongly positive avoidance	LOW (cascade modelling)
Integration investment	£80-150m/yr	£200-500m/yr (employment outcomes, lifetime fiscal contribution)	Positive but slow-realising	MEDIUM
TOTAL Labour platform	£500m-£1.1bn/yr	£1.9bn-£3.5bn/yr	+£800m to +£2.5bn/yr	MEDIUM

Implications — party's own view

• Demonstrates that route-specific tightening can deliver large net migration falls (906k → ~204k) without ECHR withdrawal or mass deportation
• Preserves international cooperation, trade access, Belfast/Good Friday Agreement integrity
• Positions Labour as governing-from-the-centre on a sensitive issue
• Maintains protection-tradition obligations Labour members care about
• Modest fiscal headroom for spending priorities elsewhere from asylum savings

• Net migration fall achieved largely by previous-government measures; presentational vulnerability
• 30-month review creates anxiety for refugee population; integration risk
• Voluntary returns scaling is slow versus political demand
• Coalition tension: integrationist Labour seats want more humane framing; Red Wall seats want tougher posture
• Reform is taking former Labour voters on the migration question; the centre may not hold electorally

Implications — external analytical view

• Lowest legal exposure of any party platform (no retrospective applications, no convention withdrawals)
• Most internally costed (Labour can demonstrate fiscal effects from official sources)
• Aligned with where the evidence base is densest (asylum cost reduction; route-specific data)
• Behavioural responses largely manageable: employers can adjust; migrants don't face cliff-edge

• 30-month reviews may not produce returns at scale (refugee cohort largely cannot return to country of origin while protection grounds persist; review process becomes administrative load without removal outcome)
• Hotel exit timeline depends on dispersal capacity that LAs report is not yet there at scale
• Net migration fall is fragile to demand shocks (e.g. care-sector wage increases stalling reduce labour demand fall)
• Political vulnerability: positioned as "managing" migration rather than "ending" the perceived problem
• Integration investment too small to move the needle at the scale of net flow this Parliament
• The Boriswave cohort reaches ILR eligibility 2026-2030 under existing rules; Labour has not addressed this

Deliverability constraints

• 30-month reviews: Home Office decision capacity already overstretched; review process needs ~30,000 staff-years over 5 years to clear caseload at scale
• Hotel exit: dispersal capacity in opposition LA areas is the constraint; NAO flags procurement bottleneck
• France scheme: numbers are far below small-boat arrival rate; deterrent effect unproven
• Integration investment: £80-150m/yr is modest against ~£15bn lifetime fiscal headroom from successful integration
• Border Security Command: legislation in place; operational maturity ~18 months

Legal exposure

LOW. No retrospective application of new rules; no convention withdrawals; no constitutional engagement issues.

• France scheme legally bilateral; depends on French cooperation continuity
• 30-month reviews compatible with Refugee Convention if conducted with full procedural safeguards
• Hotel-exit dispersal subject to LA judicial review challenges in some areas

Likely behavioural responses

• Employers (Health & Care, agriculture, hospitality): absorbed via gradual wage adjustment; some sectoral pressure on care provider margins
• Migrants: little immediate behavioural change; settlement remains predictable for those in legal route
• Source countries: France cooperates while political incentives align; may degrade
• Asylum seekers: small-boat numbers continue at historic levels (~30k-40k/yr); deterrent effect unproven
• Refugee cohort: anxiety over 30-month reviews; some will seek voluntary return if feasible; most cannot

Bottom line

A coherent governing platform with the lowest legal and operational risk profile of any party's platform. Net positive fiscal effect (~£0.8-2.5bn/yr) achievable with high confidence. But politically vulnerable to the perception that Labour is managing migration where voters demanded it be ended.

2. Conservative

Stated proposals (May 2026 platform)

The Borders Plan announced from October 2025 onwards under Kemi Badenoch:

1. Total ban on asylum claims for new illegal entrants (small-boat arrivals after a specified date) 2. ECHR withdrawal, ECAT (European Convention on Action against Trafficking) withdrawal, Human Rights Act repeal 3. Removals Force with 150,000 annual deportation target 4. Deportation of foreign criminals (faster removal pipeline; reduced appeal rights) 5. End of Immigration Tribunal, Judicial Review, and legal aid for immigration cases 6. Numerical cap on legal migration (level not specified in detail) 7. ILR qualifying period extension from 5 to 10 years

Costed implications

Proposal	Cost range	Savings/revenue range	Net fiscal effect	Confidence
Total ban on illegal-entrant asylum claims	£200-500m/yr (detention/processing)	£1.5-2.5bn/yr (asylum support reduction) IF deterrent effect materialises	Net positive (+£1.0-2.0bn/yr) IF deterrent works	LOW (deterrent effect unproven; legal exposure could reverse it)
ECHR/ECAT withdrawal + HRA repeal	£100-300m setup; £30-80m/yr	Trade/cooperation cost: £2-15bn/yr (modelled) — i.e. NEGATIVE	Net negative -£2-15bn/yr from trade/cooperation cascade	LOW (cascade modelling, contested)
150,000 deportation target	Detention scale-up: £8-20bn over 5 years (capacity 2,200 → ~50,000+); per-removal cost £100-200k = £15-30bn/yr at full target	Asylum support savings ~£3-6bn/yr if achieved	Net negative -£12-24bn/yr in operation period	LOW (no operational precedent at this scale)
Deportation of foreign criminals	£600-1,200m/yr (current ~5,634 FNO; at scale ~10-12,000)	Crime prevention savings: £200-500m/yr (illustrative); plus crime-victimisation displacement	Roughly neutral, scales with capacity	MEDIUM
End of Immigration Tribunal + JR + legal aid	£80-200m/yr saved	Behavioural costs: longer detention, judicial substitute pathways, ECHR-replacement workload	Roughly neutral; constitutional cost not fiscal	MEDIUM
Numerical cap on legal migration	£0 direct	£200m-2.5bn/yr (depends on cap level + behavioural displacement to other routes)	Modestly positive at most plausible levels	LOW
ILR qualifying period extension 5→10yrs	£0 direct administrative; ~£500m-1.5bn behavioural cost (employer turnover, retention loss in care sector)	£1-3bn/yr from delayed welfare access for non-naturalising cohort	Modestly positive at +£500m-1.5bn/yr	MEDIUM
TOTAL Conservative platform	£15-25bn/yr in operation; £8-20bn one-off setup	£3-6bn/yr direct + £200m-2.5bn cap + £500m-1.5bn ILR extension	Net negative -£10-20bn/yr in operation	LOW-MEDIUM (high cost certainty; deterrent revenue uncertainty)

Implications — party's own view

• Restores the "controllable" feel of the migration system that voters demand
• Sharp differentiation from Labour and (on deliverability) from Reform
• ILR extension specifically addresses the Boriswave cohort the previous government created
• ECHR withdrawal removes external constraint on policy choices

• Detention capacity and removal infrastructure not currently deliverable at advertised scale
• The 2022-2024 net migration peak was under previous Conservative government — taking this position is awkward
• ECHR withdrawal opens up trade/cooperation/Belfast Agreement risks the party has historically been cautious about
• Deportation target is a hostage to fortune if achievement falls short

Implications — external analytical view

• Symbolically responsive to mandate-deficit dynamics (voters demanded reduction; Conservative voters got the surge instead)
• Disrupts the smuggling business model if deterrent effect is real
• ILR extension addresses settlement timeline that has been pulled forward by the Boriswave cohort

• 150,000 deportation target requires detention capacity ~25× current; estimated 4-6 years to build at any reasonable pace; cost £8-20bn one-off plus £15-30bn/yr operational
• ECHR withdrawal creates legal exposure across the Belfast Agreement, TCA, Refugee Convention, and Council of Europe membership; cascades into trade and cooperation costs
• "Total ban on illegal-entrant asylum claims" effectively Refugee Convention non-compliance; likely first-instance challenges in domestic courts within months
• HRA repeal creates a parallel rights system that imports back common-law constraints and ECHR via international agreements not yet renegotiated
• Tribunal removal + legal-aid removal create due-process risk; political and legal blowback likely
• The Conservatives are positioned as authors of the problem AND the cure — credibility cost
• Cap on legal migration without specific level allows opponents to assume it's any number they like

Deliverability constraints

• Detention scale-up: current capacity ~2,200 places. To achieve 150,000 removals/yr requires ~25,000-50,000 detention places, depending on length-of-detention assumptions. Construction and staffing timeline 4-6 years minimum
• Removals Force: legislation needed; staffing of c.4,000-8,000 enforcement officers (current Immigration Enforcement ~2,500); 3-year build minimum
• ECHR withdrawal: Article 58 procedure; takes 6 months notice; cascades into Belfast Agreement renegotiation, TCA cooperation review, possible Council of Europe expulsion
• ILR period extension: primary legislation; transitional provisions for those already in the system; legal challenges likely on retrospective elements
• Legal aid removal: primary legislation; access-to-justice challenges

Legal exposure

HIGH. Most exposed party platform on legal grounds:

• ECHR withdrawal: Belfast Agreement integration; Refugee Convention overlap; Council of Europe; TCA Article 692 cooperation
• HRA repeal: parallel rights system creates uncertainty; common-law rights persist
• "Total ban on asylum claims": Refugee Convention non-compliance
• Retrospective ILR extension: Article 8 ECHR + common-law legitimate expectation challenges
• Legal aid + JR removal: access-to-justice challenges; likely Supreme Court engagement
• Mass-deportation operation: Article 3, 8 ECHR challenges per individual case at scale

Likely behavioural responses

• Detention/removal at scale: practical limits force triage; high-priority cases (criminals) prioritised; lower-priority cases stall — but with much higher detention cost
• Employers (care, agriculture, hospitality): acute labour shortages from cap + extension; wage pressure or production reduction
• Boriswave cohort facing extended ILR period: rush to naturalise where possible (44% jump in citizenship applications already observed pre-policy); legal challenges; political cost-of-living narrative if retention of care workers becomes politicised
• Source countries: cooperation degrades on returns where withdrawal of ECHR/HRA strains bilateral relationships
• Asylum-seeker cohort: if "total ban" upheld, displacement to alternative pathways (clandestine entry, abuse of family route, fraudulent route claims)
• EU partners: TCA cooperation downgraded; readmissions cooperation harder; Calais coordination at risk
• Northern Ireland: Belfast Agreement framework requires renegotiation; significant constitutional cost

Bottom line

The most ambitious deliverability/legal-exposure platform of any party operating within plausible mainstream electoral framing. The fiscal costs run roughly £10-20bn/yr net negative through the operation period, before deterrent effects (which may not materialise) are credited. The political logic — recover Reform-bound voters with "tough but deliverable" — runs into the deliverability problem the data identifies. Substantial legal exposure across multiple conventions and constitutional frameworks.

3. Liberal Democrats

Stated proposals (May 2026 platform)

Under Ed Davey's leadership:

1. Opposition to ECHR withdrawal 2. Support for safe legal routes (humanitarian visas, refugee resettlement scheme expansion) 3. Reversal of family visa salary threshold increases (return to ~£18,600 minimum) 4. UK-EU youth mobility scheme 5. Coordination on returns and joint operations with EU partners 6. Rejection of mass-deportation framing 7. Investment in asylum decision capacity (clear backlog faster) 8. Right to work for asylum seekers after 6 months (specific Lib Dem position)

Costed implications

Proposal	Cost range	Savings/revenue range	Net fiscal effect	Confidence
Continued ECHR membership	£0 direct	Avoids £2-15bn/yr withdrawal cascade	Strongly positive avoidance	LOW (cascade modelling)
Safe legal routes (humanitarian visa expansion)	£400-800m/yr (depending on volume)	£600-1,200m/yr (avoided small-boat reception costs IF substitution effect)	Roughly neutral; protection-tradition value	LOW (substitution effect contested)
Family visa threshold reversion to £18,600	£100-300m/yr (lower-skilled family route increase)	£0 direct; some integration benefit	Modestly negative -£100-300m/yr	MEDIUM
UK-EU youth mobility	£30-80m/yr operational	£200-500m/yr (skills inflow, sectoral benefit)	Modestly positive	MEDIUM
Returns cooperation	£40-100m/yr	£200-600m/yr (returns volume, asylum cost reduction)	Modestly positive	MEDIUM
Asylum decision capacity investment	£200-400m/yr	£600-1,200m/yr (faster processing → faster outcomes; reduced support costs)	Strongly positive	MEDIUM-HIGH
Right to work for asylum seekers after 6 months	£0 direct; ~£20m admin	£400-800m/yr (asylum support reduction; tax receipts; behavioural-crime-effect saving £100-300m)	Strongly positive	MEDIUM (German evidence transferability uncertain)
TOTAL Lib Dem platform	£800m-£1.7bn/yr	£2.0-4.4bn/yr direct + ECHR-avoidance £2-15bn/yr	Net positive +£1.2-2.7bn/yr direct; +£3-17bn/yr including ECHR-avoidance	MEDIUM

Implications — party's own view

• Maintains UK reputational and operational alignment with Western-European liberal-democratic norms
• Asylum-decision capacity investment is the highest-value rule-of-law spending available
• Right-to-work-after-6-months tackles the integration-and-crime-pipeline finding
• Family-route threshold reversion respects the rights-protective core of Lib Dem identity
• Lower legal exposure than any other restrictive platform

• Family threshold reversion will be attacked as a step backward on integration prospects
• Right-to-work-after-6-months politically vulnerable to "pull factor" argument
• Safe legal routes expansion + small-boat persistence creates "two queues" optics
• Polling base too small for these positions to be electorally dispositive

Implications — external analytical view

• Asylum decision capacity investment directly addresses the bottleneck producing the hotel cost
• Right-to-work-after-6-months has international evidence behind it (German studies on conflict-exposure crime reduction)
• ECHR retention preserves the constitutional/Belfast Agreement scaffolding
• Most fiscally efficient restrictive package available — gets the savings without the legal exposure

• Modest direct savings against headline-grabbing alternatives
• Family threshold reversion adds modest fiscal cost without obviously offsetting integration benefit
• Right-to-work-after-6-months: UK transferability of the two-thirds reduction in conflict-exposure crime effect from German evidence is not established; presented as international hypothesis
• "Pull factor" argument has limited empirical support but high political salience
• Position lacks a clear answer to the Boriswave cohort

Deliverability constraints

• Asylum decision capacity: scaling needed (current decision rate constraint); recruitment + training + IT investment timeline 18-30 months
• Right-to-work scheme: statutory instrument; integration with welfare/UC; HMRC tax administration changes; ~12 months
• Family threshold reversion: statutory instrument
• EU youth mobility: bilateral negotiation with EU; political cost-benefit calculation in Brussels
• Returns cooperation: ongoing; not new

Legal exposure

LOW. Aligned with international obligations:

• ECHR retention obviates Belfast/Good Friday Agreement risk
• Refugee Convention compliance straightforward
• Family threshold reversion may face Article 8 challenges if any further tightening attempted, but reversion alone is fine
• Right-to-work-after-6-months may face state-aid challenges from EU but post-Brexit largely irrelevant

Likely behavioural responses

• Asylum seekers: Right to work increases incentive to lodge legitimate claims and exit support; reduces incentive to disappear into informal economy
• Employers (sectoral): absorb post-6-month asylum-seeker cohort; small wage effect
• Boriswave cohort: unaffected; settled trajectory
• EU partners: more cooperative on returns and information-sharing
• Source countries: unchanged; safe legal route doesn't deter departure pressure
• Small-boat operators: demand persists; substitution toward visa-overstay or other irregular routes possible

Bottom line

The most fiscally efficient restrictive package available — most-positive net effect (~£1.2-2.7bn/yr direct, plus £2-15bn/yr in ECHR-avoidance) at the lowest legal exposure of any platform that includes restrictive elements. But politically constrained by polling and by the perceived "pull factor" arguments around right-to-work expansion.

4. Green Party

Stated proposals (May 2026 platform)

The Green Party of England and Wales has the most detailed published Migration Policy framework:

1. Aspirational world without borders (long-term framing) 2. Managed humane migration in the interim (treats migrants as citizens-in-waiting) 3. Visitor visas for any arrival (no restriction at port for non-asylum seekers) 4. Full benefit, NHS, and student finance access for settled status holders on equal terms with British citizens 5. Automatic British citizenship for all UK-born children 6. Commitment to tackling statelessness 7. Regularisation pathways for undocumented migrants without penalty 8. End of detention except in narrow circumstances 9. Implicit: preserve current settlement rights (no Boriswave cohort retrospective changes)

Costed implications

Proposal	Cost range	Savings/revenue range	Net fiscal effect	Confidence
Visitor visas for any arrival	£0 direct administrative; £40-150m/yr screening	£0; some tourism inflow; some admin reduction in current visa system	Modestly negative -£40-150m/yr	LOW
Full benefit/NHS/student finance access on equal terms	£600m-2.5bn/yr (depending on take-up; lifetime fiscal modelling re-rated for many cohorts)	Integration-outcome benefits: £400m-1.5bn/yr (employment, training, lifetime contribution)	Net negative -£200m-1bn/yr	LOW (behavioural assumptions wide)
Automatic UK-born child citizenship	£40-100m/yr admin; £200-600m/yr long-term (welfare/NHS lifetime trajectory adjustments)	Tax base expansion: £200m-1.5bn/yr long-term (if integration outcomes match)	Roughly neutral; possibly modestly positive long-term	LOW (multi-decade horizon)
Tackling statelessness	£20-50m/yr	£100-300m/yr (avoided destitution and welfare cost; HC integration)	Modestly positive	MEDIUM
Regularisation of undocumented migrants	Setup: £200-500m one-off; £100-200m/yr admin	£600m-2.5bn/yr (tax receipts from formerly informal economy; reduced cost of irregular-status enforcement; reduced informal-housing cost)	Net positive +£400m-2bn/yr	MEDIUM (Spanish/Italian regularisation evidence)
End of detention except in narrow circumstances	£-300m to -£600m/yr (current detention spending)	£100-200m/yr (reduced legal challenge costs)	Net positive (avoided cost) +£200-400m/yr; but downside in returns rate	MEDIUM
Preservation of current settlement rights (no retrospective changes)	£0 direct; political-stability value	£0 direct; avoids legal exposure cost £100-500m/yr from retrospective challenges	Modestly positive (avoidance)	MEDIUM
TOTAL Green platform	£700m-£3bn/yr	£1.4-5.7bn/yr	Net positive +£0.4-2.7bn/yr if integration outcomes are favourable; net negative £200m-£1bn/yr if not	LOW (assumption-sensitive)

Implications — party's own view

• Aligns policy with values base; honours human rights commitments
• Treats migrants as humans with futures, not as fiscal-extraction units
• Regularisation removes a significant informal-economy bias
• Statelessness commitment fulfils international obligations
• Detention end is fiscally and morally efficient
• Integration outcomes from full equal access are likely to compound long-term

• Open borders / visitor visa universal access creates integration capacity strain
• Equal benefit access creates the "welfare magnet" optics that opponents will use
• Universal child citizenship is politically vulnerable to "anchor baby" framing
• Net costs in the short term may be substantial; benefits compound but not visible at next election
• The policy package is internally consistent but politically isolated; moves the Overton window but does not deliver immediate change

Implications — external analytical view

• Regularisation has demonstrable evidence base (Spanish 2005, Italian 2003) for substantial fiscal-positive effects in 5-10 year horizon
• Detention end avoids significant operational and legal cost
• Equal access on benefits is a genuine integration policy that yields long-term contribution outcomes per international evidence
• Internal coherence as a values-based package is strongest of any party

• Visitor visa universal access is genuinely outside developed-state norms; behavioural response would likely be substantial population shift
• Equal benefit access with £600m-2.5bn/yr cost is real and would need to be funded; the offsetting integration-contribution effect takes years to compound
• Universal UK-born citizenship has fiscal trajectory effects across decades that are hard to model with confidence
• Fiscal effect highly sensitive to behavioural-response assumptions; under unfavourable assumptions the package is net negative
• Boriswave cohort issue is implicitly addressed through preservation of current rules but politically is not directly engaged with
• Politically vulnerable to misrepresentation; package as a whole will be attacked as "open borders"

Deliverability constraints

• Visitor visa for any arrival: primary legislation; UN/EU coordination if maintained; arrival-screening capacity scale-up
• Equal access on benefits: primary legislation; immigration status no longer determines eligibility (radical departure); HMRC/DWP system rebuild
• Universal UK-born citizenship: primary legislation; British Nationality Act amendment
• Regularisation: statutory instrument or primary legislation; eligibility criteria; registration window; processing capacity
• Detention end: statutory instrument; alternative-to-detention protocols; capacity reallocation

Legal exposure

MEDIUM. Mostly aligned with international obligations but novel UK legal architecture:

• Universal visitor visas: outside EU/EEA norms but consistent with OAS/regional patterns; minimal international legal exposure
• Equal access on benefits: domestic legislative; no international challenge
• Detention end: aligned with ECHR Article 5; reduces legal exposure
• Regularisation: aligned with international human-rights norms; one-off legal complexity around eligibility-criteria challenges
• Boriswave cohort preserved: avoids retrospective-change legal exposure

Likely behavioural responses

• Migrants: UK becomes substantially more attractive destination; population pressure increases short-term
• Employers (informal economy): regularisation forces formalisation; tax base expansion
• Source countries: no specific cooperation impact
• Existing migrant population: favourable integration outcomes from equal access; lifetime fiscal contribution improves
• British citizens (lower-paid): wage compression risk in some sectors as informal economy formalises into formal labour markets
• Northern Ireland: Common Travel Area implications need management

Bottom line

The most internally coherent values-based package, with genuine evidence backing for several proposals (regularisation, detention end, equal access integration outcomes). But the headline package would face significant short-term fiscal cost (-£200m to -£1bn/yr without behavioural offsets) and substantial implementation complexity. Politically positioned as "where migration policy would be if values rather than political incentives drove it" — the Greens have substantial moral authority on this within the values-base they speak for, but this is not currently within parliamentary-arithmetic reach.

5. Reform UK

Stated proposals (May 2026 platform)

The most ambitious migration platform of any major UK party in modern times:

1. Abolition of ILR as a legal status 2. Rescission of existing ILR with replacement five-year £60,000-threshold visa 3. Review of five years of asylum grants (re-examination of cases since 2020) 4. ECHR withdrawal 5. UK Deportation Command 6. Five-year low-skilled migration moratorium 7. Emergency brake on work and family visas 8. Offshore asylum processing 9. Acute Skills Shortage Visa with mandatory domestic-worker training 10. Expanded entrepreneur and investor routes

Reform's published claim: £14.3 billion savings over a Parliament. The model behind this figure has not been published.

Costed implications

Proposal	Cost range	Savings/revenue range	Net fiscal effect	Confidence
Abolition of ILR + rescission of existing	£200-500m setup; £150-400m/yr operational; £2-5bn/yr in legal challenges	Welfare displacement: £400-1,200m/yr from delayed access; integration outcome cost £400m-1.5bn/yr (employer turnover, retention loss)	Net negative -£2-6bn/yr in operation period; legal exposure unbounded	LOW (no precedent for retrospective settlement rescission at scale in Western state)
5-year £60,000-threshold replacement visa	£40-80m setup; £30-60m/yr admin	Behavioural: care/health/agriculture sectoral collapse risk; ~£500m-2bn/yr cost from labour shortages; ~£200-500m/yr from delayed welfare access	Strongly negative -£500m-2bn/yr (sectoral)	LOW
Review of 5yrs asylum grants	£400-1,000m/yr (operational)	£100-300m/yr (where revocation followed by removal) — capped by removal capacity	Net negative -£300-700m/yr	LOW
ECHR withdrawal	£100-300m setup; £30-80m/yr	Trade/cooperation cost: £2-15bn/yr (cascade modelling) — i.e. NEGATIVE	Net negative -£2-15bn/yr from cascade	LOW (cascade modelling)
UK Deportation Command	£400-1,000m/yr operational; £4-10bn one-off if scaled	£200-500m/yr (visible enforcement effect)	Net negative -£200-500m/yr	LOW
5-year low-skilled migration moratorium	£0 direct; sectoral cost £600m-2bn/yr	Tax base reduction; behavioural displacement to other routes; modest welfare cost reduction £100-400m/yr	Net negative -£500m-1.5bn/yr	LOW
Emergency brake on work/family visas	£0 direct	£200-600m/yr (lower volume of low-contribution settlement)	Modestly positive	LOW
Offshore asylum processing	£4-8bn one-off; £600m-1.5bn/yr operational (Rwanda comparator)	£400-1,000m/yr (asylum support reduction IF deterrent effect materialises)	Net negative -£400-1,000m/yr in operation	LOW (Rwanda evidence inconclusive)
Acute Skills Shortage Visa + training	£200-500m/yr training subsidy	£400m-1.5bn/yr (productivity, sectoral retention)	Roughly neutral; long-term positive	MEDIUM
Expanded entrepreneur/investor routes	£30-60m/yr admin	£100-400m/yr (higher-revenue cohort)	Modestly positive	MEDIUM
TOTAL Reform platform	£10-25bn/yr operational; £4-10bn one-off	£1.4-4bn/yr direct + £200m-2bn/yr enforcement effect	Net negative -£8-25bn/yr in operation	LOW (high cost certainty; deterrent revenue speculative)

Reform's own published claim and analytical comparison

Reform's published claim: £14.3bn savings over a Parliament (5 years) ≈ £2.86bn/yr. The model has not been published.

This claim does not survive the assumptions required to construct it:

• Net fiscal contribution savings would need to materialise within 5 years; lifetime fiscal modelling has 30-50 year horizons
• Removal volumes implicit in the claim require detention/transit capacity not currently available
• ECHR withdrawal is presented as cost-neutral; the cascade through Belfast Agreement, TCA, Council of Europe is not costed
• The retrospective-rescission element generates legal challenge costs that scale with the cohort affected (~600,000+ people) — these are not in the model

External analytical estimate: Net negative -£8-25bn/yr in operation period, before deterrent effects (which may not materialise) are credited. If deterrent effects are at the favourable end of the range, the platform could approach fiscal neutrality. If at the unfavourable end, the cost is substantially larger.

Implications — party's own view

• Decisive electoral mandate response to voter frustration with Conservative-era settlement decisions
• Clear positioning that no other party offers — voters who supported Brexit on immigration grounds get an answer
• Boriswave cohort directly addressed
• Deportation Command makes restriction tangible and enforceable
• Sectoral moratorium gives domestic training and wage adjustment time to operate

• Deliverability problem similar to Conservative platform — capacity not currently in place
• £14.3bn figure is a hostage to fortune if it can't be defended publicly
• Retrospective rescission is the most legally exposed element of any party platform
• Sectoral moratorium will face acute pushback from care, agriculture, hospitality
• ECHR withdrawal cascade has not been worked through publicly

Implications — external analytical view

• Reform is the only party platform that addresses both the asylum cohort AND the Boriswave settlement cohort
• Sectoral moratorium creates an honest forcing-function for domestic training and wage adjustment
• The Acute Skills Shortage Visa with training is a serious sectoral approach not present in other platforms
• Recognises voter mandate-deficit dynamics that other parties have evaded

• Retrospective ILR rescission (with Article 8 legitimate-expectation implications) is novel in Western liberal democracy at this scale; legal exposure unbounded
• Five-year low-skilled moratorium would require sectoral collapse-management plans not present in the platform
• The £14.3bn figure needs the model published; without it, it's a political claim, not a costing
• Deportation infrastructure scale-up timeline 4-6 years; cost £8-15bn one-off + operational
• ECHR withdrawal cascades through Belfast Agreement (Northern Ireland constitutional consequence) and TCA cooperation
• Offshore asylum processing runs into the Rwanda-style problems that have already proven inconclusive
• Sectoral collapse risk in care, agriculture, hospitality — the most vulnerable workers are also the most replaceable in the political narrative, but the most consequential for service provision
• Citizenship application surge (+44% Q4 2025) suggests a substantial portion of the affected cohort will naturalise before policy implementation, defeating part of the rescission objective

Deliverability constraints

• ILR rescission: primary legislation; transitional provisions; legal challenges across Article 8, Refugee Convention, common-law legitimate expectation, Belfast Agreement; estimated 18-36 months to enact, 5+ years to implement, with substantial portion stayed by courts
• 5-year asylum review: primary legislation; capacity for ~30,000-50,000 review cases per year against current decision capacity; outcome enforcement requires removal capacity
• ECHR withdrawal: Article 58; 6 months notice; cascading renegotiations
• Deportation Command: primary legislation; staffing 6,000-12,000 enforcement officers; 4-6 year build
• Low-skilled moratorium: statutory instrument; sectoral exemption negotiation; transition planning
• Offshore processing: bilateral agreement with host state; legal challenges; operational complexity

Legal exposure

VERY HIGH. The most legally exposed party platform:

• Retrospective ILR rescission: Article 8 ECHR + common-law legitimate expectation + Refugee Convention non-refoulement + Belfast Agreement cascade
• ECHR withdrawal: Belfast Agreement integration; Council of Europe; TCA cooperation
• 5-year asylum review: substantial portion will be Convention-protected; reversal of grants requires extremely high evidentiary bar
• Mass deportation: Article 3, 8 ECHR per individual case at scale
• Offshore processing: Article 3 ECHR (chain refoulement); Refugee Convention compliance challenges

Likely behavioural responses

• Boriswave cohort: Q4 2025 citizenship applications already rose 44% in anticipation; full application surge likely; legal challenges from those caught in the gap
• Employers (care, agriculture, hospitality): acute labour shortages; visible service-provision disruption; political pushback
• Source countries: cooperation degrades on returns; some offer sanctuary to UK-deportees
• Existing migrants in adjacent statuses: anxiety drives early naturalisation, family reunion, alternative-route applications
• Asylum seekers: if deterrent effect materialises, channel switches; if not, claims continue
• EU partners: TCA cooperation downgraded; readmission cooperation harder; Calais coordination at risk
• Northern Ireland: Belfast Agreement renegotiation creates cascading constitutional consequences
• Currency/business confidence: if implemented at speed and scale, sterling weakness, business retrenchment, capital outflow risks

Bottom line

The most ambitious party platform, with genuine identification of voter-mandate-deficit dynamics that other parties have evaded. But the published cost claim (£14.3bn savings) is unsupported by published modelling; the actual cost on plausible operational assumptions is net negative ~£8-25bn/yr in operation. Legal exposure is the highest of any platform. The combination of retrospective settlement rescission + ECHR withdrawal + mass deportation creates risks across the constitutional, fiscal, and operational dimensions that would require sustained political will and Treasury resource over 5+ years to manage.

6. Restore Britain

Stated proposals (May 2026 platform)

The 133-page mass deportation policy document is the most detailed published deportation framework offered by any UK party. Stated positions include:

1. Large-scale deportation of all undocumented residents (estimated cohort 600,000-900,000) 2. Net-negative immigration target (more leaving than arriving) 3. ECHR withdrawal 4. Referendum on capital punishment reinstatement 5. Ban on burqa and niqab 6. Abolition of kosher and halal slaughter 7. Restoration of Christian principles (constitutional and educational) 8. Substantial reduction or abolition of BBC public funding 9. Reduced taxation; smaller state

Costed implications

Proposal	Cost range	Savings/revenue range	Net fiscal effect	Confidence
Large-scale deportation of undocumented residents (600k-900k cohort)	One-off enforcement: £60-180bn over 5-10 years (£100-200k per person at scale, plus detention infrastructure £15-30bn one-off)	Estimated welfare/services savings: £4-8bn/yr after cohort removed	Net negative -£15-30bn over 5-year period	LOW (no precedent at this scale in any liberal democracy)
Net-negative immigration target	Achievable only via mass deportation as above; no separate cost	Same as above	Same as above	LOW
ECHR withdrawal	£100-300m setup; £30-80m/yr	Trade/cooperation cost: £2-15bn/yr (cascade modelling)	Net negative -£2-15bn/yr	LOW (cascade modelling)
Referendum on capital punishment	Referendum: £100-200m one-off	If reinstated: legal-system costs vs international standing/trade impact	Roughly neutral fiscally; constitutional consequences large	LOW
Ban on burqa/niqab	£5-20m/yr enforcement	£0 direct savings; significant reputational/social-cohesion costs	Net negative (cohesion cost)	LOW
Abolition of kosher/halal slaughter	£20-40m/yr enforcement	£0; substantial reputational/social-cohesion costs	Net negative	LOW
Restoration of Christian principles	£0 direct; £10-30m/yr education changes	Cultural/electoral signal value; no direct fiscal effect	Roughly neutral fiscally	LOW
Reduction/abolition of BBC public funding	£0; £3-4bn/yr saved from licence fee abolition	Equivalent transferred to subscription/voluntary funding model	Roughly neutral fiscally; substantial restructuring cost	MEDIUM
Reduced taxation; smaller state	Substantially negative for Treasury revenue depending on scale; £20-100bn+/yr depending on scope	Implicit assumption that lower taxation → growth offset	Net negative on standard fiscal modelling	LOW
TOTAL Restore Britain platform	£60-180bn over 5-10 years (deportation operation alone); plus £20-100bn/yr if tax reductions applied without compensating spending cuts	£4-8bn/yr operational savings post-deportation; £20-100bn/yr implicit growth	Net negative £15-30bn over 5 years (deportation); fiscal direction undetermined depending on tax/spending choices	VERY LOW (most assumption-sensitive of any platform)

Implications — party's own view

• Maximum responsiveness to voter mandate-deficit dynamics
• Net-negative immigration would directly address the perceived problem
• Removal of undocumented residents is the policy other parties don't quite advocate but voters say they want
• Cultural restoration package (Christian principles, BBC reform, slaughter rules) is part of the broader project of rebuilding national cohesion
• Capital punishment referendum delivers democratic accountability on the question

• The enforcement scale required is unprecedented in any liberal democracy
• Detention infrastructure scale-up timeline is decadal, not parliamentary
• The cultural-restoration elements (slaughter rules, BBC, dress codes) divert political capital from the migration core
• Polling at 9% (Reform 21%) suggests electoral position is constrained

Implications — external analytical view

• Internal coherence as a values-based right-flank position; voters who hold those values now have a vehicle
• Pulls the broader Conservative-Reform competitive space further right (Overton window effect)
• Capital punishment referendum is at least democratically clean even if outcome is contested

• Mass deportation operation at the 600,000-900,000 scale: no precedent in any liberal democracy in the modern era; would require detention infrastructure exceeding US ICE at peak; one-off cost £60-180bn over decade-plus timeline
• ECHR withdrawal cascade through Belfast Agreement, TCA, Council of Europe membership
• Burqa/niqab ban: Article 9 ECHR (religious freedom); even with ECHR withdrawal, common-law religious-freedom protections persist
• Kosher/halal abolition: Article 9 ECHR; Article 14 (discrimination); Council of Europe censure; Jewish and Muslim community impact severe
• Restoration of Christian principles in state institutions: Article 9 ECHR + Article 14 (discrimination); contested even on common-law grounds
• BBC funding reduction: legitimate policy debate but separable from migration platform
• "Reduced taxation; smaller state": no specific cuts identified that would offset the deportation-operation cost; arithmetic does not close
• Capital punishment reinstatement: Council of Europe expulsion; ECHR Protocol 13 + 6 violations
• Religious-freedom and minority-rights costs are not "fiscal" but represent constitutional and reputational costs the platform does not account for
• Polling at 9% combined with the structural electoral system means the platform pulls the debate without governing capacity to deliver it

Deliverability constraints

• Mass deportation: detention infrastructure 100,000+ places needed at peak; unprecedented in modern Western state; logistical capacity (transit aircraft, source-country acceptance) far below requirement
• ECHR withdrawal: Article 58; cascading renegotiations as per Conservative/Reform platforms
• Cultural restoration package: primary legislation across multiple domains; sustained political capital required; constitutional challenges
• Capital punishment referendum: primary legislation; Council of Europe expulsion process during; ECHR Protocol 13 violation; international/EU treaty exposure

Legal exposure

EXTREME. The most legally exposed platform of any party:

• Mass deportation: Article 3, 8 ECHR per individual case
• ECHR withdrawal cascading effects
• Religious-freedom rules: Article 9 ECHR, Article 14, common-law religious-freedom protections
• Capital punishment: ECHR Protocol 6, 13; Council of Europe expulsion
• Belfast Agreement: ECHR integration plus religious-tradition implications for constituency

Likely behavioural responses

• Affected populations: acute fear, attempts to formalise status before deadlines, attempts to reach jurisdictions with stronger protection
• Source countries: strong refusal of deportee acceptance for many cohorts (no return agreements feasible at scale)
• Religious communities (Jewish, Muslim): community-level emigration consideration; political response across the party system
• EU partners: comprehensive cooperation degradation; Calais closure of cooperation; trade implications
• Northern Ireland: Belfast Agreement renegotiation under acute pressure
• Business confidence/sterling: substantial outflow risk if implementation seriously attempted
• Council of Europe / international standing: UK loss of standing in major international institutions

Bottom line

The most ambitious and most legally/operationally exposed party platform. Internal coherence as a right-flank values position is real; the 9% polling base reflects voters with those values. But the platform is positioned to pull the debate rather than govern, and the operational/fiscal/legal cost of implementation as stated would be unprecedented in modern Western state experience. The cultural-restoration elements (religious-freedom rules, BBC funding, capital punishment) increase legal and reputational exposure without obvious migration-policy effect. Most appropriately understood as a position document — what would be required to fully deliver maximum-restriction migration policy — rather than as a costed legislative programme.

7. Scottish National Party

Stated proposals (May 2026 platform)

The SNP holds the only major UK-government-level pro-migration position alongside the Greens, grounded in Scotland-specific demographic and labour-market context:

1. Devolution of migration powers to Holyrood (allowing Scotland to set differentiated visa criteria) 2. Restoration of post-study work route for Scottish university graduates 3. Maintenance of NHS workforce and care-sector recruitment from overseas 4. Public framing of migration as economic and social asset 5. Opposition to ECHR withdrawal 6. Opposition to Reform-style mass deportation 7. Implicit: differentiated approach for Scotland that other parties oppose

Costed implications

Proposal	Cost range	Savings/revenue range	Net fiscal effect	Confidence
Devolution of migration powers	£30-100m/yr operational (Scottish government capacity)	Sectoral and demographic gains: £400-1,500m/yr Scotland-specific (population, fiscal contribution, public-service workforce)	Net positive +£300m-1.4bn/yr Scotland-only; UK-wide adjustment effects modest	LOW (no devolved precedent)
Restoration of post-study work for Scottish unis	£0 direct; modest revenue uplift	£200-600m/yr (HE sector revenue; graduate earnings)	Net positive +£200m-600m/yr Scotland-specific	MEDIUM
NHS/care workforce continuity	£0 direct (status quo defense)	£400m-1.2bn/yr (avoided cost from sectoral collapse if Reform-style restriction applied)	Net positive (avoided cost)	MEDIUM
Pro-migration public framing	£0 direct	Soft factor; integration outcomes via cohesion	Roughly neutral fiscally; cohesion value	LOW
ECHR retention (alignment with UK-wide Lib Dem position)	£0 direct	Avoids £200m-1.5bn/yr Scotland-share of UK-wide cascade	Strongly positive avoidance	LOW
Opposition to mass deportation	£0 direct; defensive position	Avoids Scotland-share of UK-wide deportation cost	Strongly positive avoidance	LOW
TOTAL SNP platform	£30-100m/yr operational	£600m-2.3bn/yr Scotland-specific direct + £400m-2bn/yr avoided UK-wide cost share	Net positive +£800m-2.3bn/yr Scotland; cooperative effect on UK-wide outcome	MEDIUM

Implications — party's own view

• Scotland-specific demographic case is genuinely strongest in the UK (population decline, ageing, sectoral workforce gaps)
• Devolved approach serves the constitutional case for further devolution
• Position differentiates SNP from Labour and creates wedge with UK-wide Conservative-Reform direction
• Pro-migration framing aligns with Scottish public sentiment historically
• Mairi McAllan's "too few migrants" intervention crystallises position

• 2026 Holyrood result returned SNP as largest party but without majority; pro-independence majority requires Greens
• Devolution of migration powers requires UK-government cooperation that's not forthcoming
• The "too few migrants" framing is electorally vulnerable in some Scottish seats
• Differentiated UK approach creates Common Travel Area complications

Implications — external analytical view

• Scotland's demographic fundamentals genuinely differ from England's; differentiated approach is policy-rational
• HE sector dependence on international students is structural; restoration is fiscally efficient
• Care sector and NHS workforce continuity prevents sectoral collapse
• Aligns with Scottish public opinion which has been more pro-migration than English equivalents

• Differentiated migration approach within UK is operationally complex (residence verification; benefit access; CTA implications)
• Post-study work scheme has historical issues with abuse and drop-out; restoration needs design improvement
• Devolution proposal lacks UK-government partner; political reality unfavourable
• Scottish independence as ultimate destination muddles the migration-policy case
• Scotland-specific solution does not address UK-wide settlement pressures

Deliverability constraints

• Devolution of migration powers: primary UK legislation; Scotland Act amendment; UK government cooperation; estimated 5-10+ year political timeline at most charitable
• Post-study work scheme: UK-government-administered; Holyrood lacks unilateral authority
• NHS/care workforce: primarily within Scottish-government control via Scottish-only visa pilots and recruitment; partial implementation possible
• Public framing: controllable via Scottish government messaging

Legal exposure

LOW. Aligned with UK convention obligations:

• Devolution proposals create UK-internal legal complexity but not international legal exposure
• ECHR retention obviates Belfast Agreement risk
• Standard refugee/protection obligations preserved

Likely behavioural responses

• Migrants choosing UK destination: Scotland becomes relatively more attractive vs. England-and-Wales; modest relocation effect
• Sectoral employers in Scotland (care, agriculture, hospitality, HE): stable workforce; predictability premium
• UK government: resistance to differentiated devolution
• Employers in England-Wales: Scottish "sandpit" approach may be seen as model or as threat depending on sector
• Source countries: unchanged
• EU/CTA dynamics: if differentiated approach implemented, Scotland-Ireland-UK CTA implications need management

Bottom line

A coherent and Scotland-specific platform that responds to genuine demographic differences. Net fiscal effect strongly positive Scotland-specific (+£800m-2.3bn/yr), with avoided-cost benefit from UK-wide outcomes if SNP positions hold. Primary deliverability constraint is UK-government cooperation that is not currently available. The platform's strength is internal coherence and demographic defensibility; its limit is parliamentary reach.

8. Plaid Cymru

Stated proposals (May 2026 platform)

The Plaid migration position broadly aligns with the SNP framework, with Welsh-specific dimensions:

1. Regional sensitivity of immigration criteria (Wales-specific) 2. Opposition to ECHR withdrawal 3. Support for safe legal routes 4. Restoration of post-study work for Welsh universities 5. Pro-managed-migration framing within Welsh demographic and labour-market context 6. Welsh-language workforce considerations (public services, education, integration) 7. Constitutional case for further Senedd powers

Costed implications

Proposal	Cost range	Savings/revenue range	Net fiscal effect	Confidence
Regional sensitivity of immigration	£20-60m/yr Welsh capacity	£200-800m/yr (sectoral retention agriculture, processing; HE)	Net positive +£140m-740m/yr Wales-specific	LOW (no devolved precedent)
ECHR retention (UK-wide)	£0 direct	Avoids Wales-share of UK-wide cascade	Strongly positive avoidance	LOW
Safe legal routes	£20-50m/yr Wales-share	£40-100m/yr (avoided clandestine entry)	Roughly neutral; protection-tradition value	LOW
Post-study work for Welsh unis	£0 direct	£80-300m/yr (HE sector; graduate earnings)	Net positive Wales-specific	MEDIUM
Welsh-language integration considerations	£15-40m/yr	Cohesion outcome value; long-term integration efficiency	Roughly neutral fiscally; substantial cultural value	LOW
Further Senedd powers	Constitutional / not directly fiscal	Long-term governance gains	Neutral; constitutional outcome	LOW
TOTAL Plaid platform	£55-150m/yr operational	£320m-1.2bn/yr Wales-specific	Net positive +£170m-1.05bn/yr Wales	MEDIUM

Implications — party's own view

• Welsh-specific demographic and sectoral pressures are real
• Regional sensitivity respects Wales-specific cultural context
• Cross-party Welsh consensus on further devolution provides cross-party scaffolding
• 2026 Senedd result strongest yet for Plaid

• Wales has fewer devolved powers than Scotland; constitutional framework limits unilateral approach
• Welsh-language consideration is politically contested even within Wales
• Plaid is in a triangular pro-independence framework with SNP/Sinn Féin; UK-wide leverage limited

Implications — external analytical view

• Welsh agriculture (lamb, beef, dairy, soft fruit, processing) has been disproportionately affected by post-Brexit restrictions; sectoral case is real
• Welsh-language community integration is a legitimate cultural-policy consideration
• Plaid's cross-party scaffolding (Plaid + Welsh Labour + Welsh Greens + Welsh Lib Dems supporting devolution expansion) creates a Welsh consensus framework
• Lower deliverability risk than SNP position because of more modest scope

• Wales' rural population structure means migration cohorts that work in agriculture/processing may not contribute long-term to Welsh-language community integration
• Senedd lacks tax powers comparable to Scottish Rate of Income Tax; fiscal autonomy is limited
• Welsh-language integration considerations may be vulnerable to mischaracterisation

Deliverability constraints

• Regional sensitivity: UK government cooperation; primary legislation; Welsh-specific scheme design
• ECHR retention: UK-wide; outside Plaid's direct control
• Post-study work for Welsh unis: UK-government-administered
• Welsh-language integration: primarily within Welsh-government control; partial implementation possible

Legal exposure

LOW. Aligned with UK convention obligations.

Likely behavioural responses

• Welsh sector employers: stable workforce in agriculture/processing; predictability premium
• HE sector (Cardiff, Swansea, Bangor, Aberystwyth): improved international student trajectory
• Welsh-language communities: integration support reduces cohesion friction
• UK government: mixed cooperation; less hostile than to SNP devolution proposals (smaller scope)

Bottom line

A coherent regional platform with modest scope and lower legal/deliverability exposure than SNP. Net positive fiscal effect Wales-specific (+£170m-1.05bn/yr) with cooperative effect on UK-wide outcomes. Primary constraint is constitutional reach (no devolved tax powers; smaller mandate than Scotland).

9. Democratic Unionist Party

Stated proposals (May 2026 platform)

The DUP holds a unionist position with specific Northern Ireland implications for UK-wide migration policy:

1. Generally supportive of moderate UK-wide immigration framing (neither maximally restrictive nor maximally permissive) 2. Opposition to ECHR withdrawal IF this would compromise the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 3. Support for points-based system continuation 4. Strong border control in framing 5. Northern Ireland-specific concerns:

• Common Travel Area integrity
• Northern Ireland Protocol / Windsor Framework operation
• Belfast/Good Friday Agreement constraints
• Northern Ireland-specific labour-market structure

Costed implications

Proposal	Cost range	Savings/revenue range	Net fiscal effect	Confidence
Moderate UK-wide framing	£0 direct	£0 direct; political-stability value	Neutral fiscally	MEDIUM
ECHR retention (Belfast Agreement protection)	£0 direct	Avoids NI-share of UK-wide cascade	Strongly positive avoidance	LOW
Points-based system continuation	£0 direct (status quo); modest setup if reformed	£0 direct; economic stability value	Neutral fiscally; structural value	MEDIUM
Strong border control	£40-100m/yr NI-share UK-wide spend	£100-300m/yr NI-share UK-wide return	Roughly neutral	LOW
CTA integrity preservation	£0 direct	Avoids £100-400m/yr cost of CTA disruption	Strongly positive avoidance	LOW
Northern Ireland Protocol operational continuity	£0 direct (operational)	Avoids £200-600m/yr cost of disruption	Strongly positive avoidance	LOW
TOTAL DUP platform	£40-100m/yr	£400m-1.3bn/yr NI-specific avoided cost from convention/CTA preservation	Net positive +£300m-1.2bn/yr NI; broader UK-wide cooperative effect	MEDIUM

Implications — party's own view

• DUP's Northern Ireland-specific concerns are unique and not addressed by other parties
• ECHR retention specifically protects the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement framework
• Common Travel Area preservation maintains historical UK-Ireland mobility
• Moderate UK-wide framing keeps DUP available for cross-party Westminster cooperation
• The position provides Northern Ireland-specific protection that would not exist if DUP left the question to UK-wide politics

• Position is more constraint-driven than agenda-driven; difficult to articulate independent migration policy
• Internal Northern Ireland politics on migration are complex (loyalist/nationalist community attitudes vary)
• DUP's parliamentary leverage depends on UK-government parliamentary arithmetic
• Position is reactive to UK-wide politics rather than proactive

Implications — external analytical view

• DUP correctly identifies that ECHR withdrawal cascades into Belfast Agreement renegotiation; constitutional protection preserved
• Common Travel Area is a real constraint that other parties' platforms have not addressed
• Northern Ireland-specific labour-market structure creates legitimate sectoral concerns
• Moderate position avoids the legal exposure of more ambitious platforms

• DUP's parliamentary leverage is contingent on close arithmetic; not assured
• The position is largely defensive; lacks proactive agenda-setting on migration
• Northern Ireland-specific concerns may not be sufficiently understood by Westminster colleagues; the DUP must keep articulating the framework
• Internal political pressures in NI may shift position

Deliverability constraints

• Moderate UK-wide framing: depends on UK-government / parliamentary cooperation
• ECHR retention: depends on UK-wide majority on the question
• CTA preservation: depends on UK-wide policy decisions
• NI-specific: within DUP's direct influence at devolved level

Legal exposure

LOW. Position is convention-aligned and Belfast Agreement-protective.

Likely behavioural responses

• Northern Ireland communities: stability under Belfast Agreement framework
• Republic of Ireland: CTA cooperation maintained
• EU partners: Northern Ireland Protocol operates as designed
• DUP electoral position: moderate framing competitive across the unionist community

Bottom line

A constraint-oriented platform with the lowest legal exposure and the Northern Ireland-specific protection-of-frameworks that other parties' platforms do not provide. Net positive fiscal effect from avoided-cost dynamics (+£300m-1.2bn/yr NI-specific). Primary value is in keeping the Belfast Agreement / CTA / Northern Ireland Protocol framework intact during UK-wide migration policy debates. The position is largely defensive but is the only platform that has Northern Ireland-specific protection as its core concern.

Comparative summary: all 9 parties

Net fiscal effect of stated platform (full implementation, central estimate)

Party	Net fiscal effect (annual)	Confidence	Legal exposure	Deliverability
Labour	+£0.8 to +£2.5bn/yr	MEDIUM	LOW	HIGH (already governing)
Lib Dem	+£1.2 to +£2.7bn/yr direct; up to +£17bn/yr including ECHR-avoidance	MEDIUM	LOW	MEDIUM (out of government)
SNP	+£0.8 to +£2.3bn/yr Scotland-specific	MEDIUM	LOW	LOW (UK-government dependent)
Plaid Cymru	+£0.17 to +£1.05bn/yr Wales-specific	MEDIUM	LOW	LOW (UK-government dependent)
DUP	+£0.3 to +£1.2bn/yr NI-specific avoided cost	MEDIUM	LOW	MEDIUM (parliamentary leverage)
Green Party	-£1.0bn to +£2.7bn/yr (assumption-sensitive)	LOW	MEDIUM	LOW (parliamentary reach limited)
Conservative	-£10 to -£20bn/yr in operation period	LOW-MEDIUM	HIGH	LOW (capacity gaps)
Reform UK	-£8 to -£25bn/yr in operation period	LOW	VERY HIGH	LOW (capacity + legal challenges)
Restore Britain	-£15 to -£30bn over 5 years (deportation operation alone)	VERY LOW	EXTREME	VERY LOW (no precedent)

Most consequential proposals across parties

Proposal	Held by	Net fiscal effect	Legal exposure
Hotel exit + dispersal procurement (asylum accommodation)	Labour, Lib Dem	Strongly positive +£0.6-1.4bn/yr	LOW
Right to work for asylum seekers after 6 months	Lib Dem	Net positive +£0.4-0.8bn/yr	LOW
Asylum decision capacity investment	Lib Dem	Strongly positive +£0.6-1.2bn/yr	LOW
Continued ECHR membership	Labour, Lib Dem, Green, SNP, Plaid, DUP	Strongly positive (avoids £2-15bn/yr cascade)	n/a
Family route threshold maintenance	Labour, Conservative	Modestly positive	LOW
Health & Care salary increase	Labour	Modestly positive +£400-800m/yr	LOW
ILR period extension 5→10yrs	Conservative	+£0.5-1.5bn/yr after costs	MEDIUM (retrospective elements)
Mass deportation 150,000/yr	Conservative	Strongly negative -£12-24bn/yr	VERY HIGH
ECHR withdrawal	Conservative, Reform, Restore	Strongly negative (-£2-15bn/yr cascade)	EXTREME
ILR rescission	Reform	Strongly negative; legal exposure unbounded	EXTREME
Mass deportation of 600k-900k undocumented	Restore	Net negative -£15-30bn over 5 years	EXTREME
Devolution of migration powers	SNP	Net positive (Scotland-specific)	LOW
Universal child citizenship	Green	Long-term modestly positive	LOW
Regularisation of undocumented migrants	Green	Net positive +£0.4-2.0bn/yr	MEDIUM

Cross-cutting observations

1. Most-positive direct fiscal effect: Lib Dem platform (right-to-work + asylum decision capacity + ECHR retention). The combination of evidence-led measures with low legal exposure is fiscally efficient; cost: limited polling base means parliamentary reach is constrained.

2. Most-positive avoided-cost effect: Any platform that maintains ECHR membership (Labour, Lib Dem, Green, SNP, Plaid, DUP). The ECHR withdrawal cascade is the single largest fiscal liability in the policy space.

3. Most-negative direct fiscal effect: Conservative and Reform platforms in operation period (-£10-25bn/yr). The cost is real and visible; the deterrent revenue offset (asylum support reduction) is plausible but speculative.

4. Highest legal exposure: Reform (retrospective ILR rescission + ECHR withdrawal + 5yr asylum review) and Restore (mass deportation at unprecedented scale + religious-freedom rules + capital punishment).

5. Lowest deliverability: Restore Britain (no precedent for the deportation operation at scale); Reform and Conservative platforms (capacity gaps in detention/removal infrastructure).

6. Best-aligned with Boriswave cohort question: Reform (directly engages with retrospective rescission); Conservative (ILR period extension addresses prospectively); Labour (does not engage); Greens, Lib Dems, SNP, Plaid, DUP (address through alternative integration framings).

7. Best-aligned with Belfast Agreement integrity: DUP (centred on framework protection); Labour, Lib Dem, Green, SNP, Plaid (compatible). Conservative, Reform, Restore (conflict via ECHR withdrawal).

8. Most internally coherent: All 9 platforms have internal coherence within their stated values. The disagreement is about which values are weighted, not about evidence; the evidence is shared.

What this comparison cannot tell us

• Which platform "should" win. That depends on values weighting (cohesion vs. protection vs. fiscal vs. demographic vs. capacity vs. emigration vs. sovereignty), not on evidence alone.

• What the political response would be. Behavioural responses (employer adjustment, source-country cooperation, cohort behaviour) are the largest source of uncertainty. Multiple plausible outcomes exist for each platform.

• What the long-term consequences would be. Lifetime fiscal modelling extends 30-50 years; political timelines are 5-year. Long-term integration outcomes (especially second-generation effects from current cohorts) compound differently under each platform.

• What public legitimacy would survive. Mandate-deficit dynamics (voters demanding reduction; reduction not occurring) are themselves a political variable that responds to which platform is in office and how it's communicated. Reform's pitch is that the mandate-deficit dynamic itself requires the most ambitious platform; other parties' positions implicitly trust voters to understand more nuanced outcomes.

This document supplements but does not replace the master document and the 9 party briefings, which provide the qualitative analysis and the within-worldview engagement. This document provides the comparable analytical layer for cross-platform analysis.